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REVISITING THE POLITICS OF BELONGING
IN CAMEROON
Ben Page, Martin Evans and Claire Mercer
Subjectively, the issue of ‘national’ identity is that indistinct domain of psychic and
historical experience which transforms identity into belonging:
‘I am’ becomes ‘I am one of them’, ‘to be’ becomes ‘to belong’.
Julia Kristeva (1995: 140)
Modernity and belonging just don’t go together.
Michael Ignatieff (1996: 85)
Conviviality takes hold when exposure to otherness involves more than jeopardy.
Paul Gilroy (2005)
INTRODUCTION: HOMETOWN ASSOCIATIONS IN CAMEROON
Rural home areas have taken on new significance as a source of political
legitimacy for urban-based elites in some parts of sub-Saharan Africa.
This appeal to ‘home’ focuses attention on who is an autochthon –
a ‘son or daughter of the soil’ – capable of acting (and voting) in the
perceived interests of their place of origin. It also focuses attention on
who is not an autochthon but a ‘stranger’ and how to treat them (Shack
1979). A hardening of identities around claims to belong is wedded to
a process of excluding outsiders. Over a decade ago Peter Geschiere
and Josef Gugler (1998a: 309) edited an influential issue of Africa in
which they argued that an ‘increasing obsession with “autochthony”
throughout the continent . . . triggers a politics of belonging’.
The politics of belonging has proved to be a powerful analytical
framework with almost global application,1 but its African inflection
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1Peter Geschiere’s The Perils of Belonging (2009) illustrates the global salience of this
framework by including a chapter on belonging in the Netherlands. For other work presented
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seems to have gained particular traction (Broch-Due 2005; Englund
and Nyamnjoh 2004; Eyoh 1999; Kuba and Lentz 2006; Nyamnjoh
2005; Schipper 1999). Evidence for this comes both from countries
where nation building has been problematic, such as Cameroon
(Ceuppens and Geschiere 2005), Zimbabwe (Hammer 2002) and
Côte d’Ivoire (Marshall 2006), and those where it has been deemed
relatively successful, such as in Botswana (Nyamnjoh 2006, 2007),
South Africa (Bangeni and Kapp 2005), Ghana and Burkina Faso
(Lentz 2006, 2007a).
But how is this politics of belonging practised? In the Cameroonian
case the national government has been shown to have instrumentalized
the sentiments associated with home in its own interest (Eyoh 1998;
Fonchingong 2005; Gabriel 1999; P. Nkwi and Socpa 1997; W. Nkwi
2006; Nyamnjoh 1999; Yenshu 2006). It does so in order to help
secure regional power bases and to undermine political rivals by
nurturing localist movements and so pre-empting the emergence of any
ideologically coherent opposition (Geschiere 2004). Thus the rise of
the importance of autochthony was closely associated with the rise of
multi-party politics; it emerged as an opportunistic strategy by which
the effect of democratic innovations could be annulled. The resulting
ethno-territorialization of national politics risks overturning gains in
promoting national-level identity, as a rural Africa of fictive ethnic
homelands becomes ‘the mainspring of xenophobias and destructive
subnationalisms’ (Boone 2003: 1). From the perspective of local
elites, this politics can be used to mask or justify interventions in
baser local material conflicts. For example, where population densities
are high, fertile land is scarce and agriculture provides a degree of
security, the language of belonging can license land disputes. Where
central state resources are distributed in relation to bureaucratic
institutions (such as MPs or via divisional headquarters) the language
of belonging can permit claims to be made for a new parliamentary
constituency or some other government space. The politics of
belonging in Cameroon sanctions the establishment to pursue their
interests.
Key contributions in this area (Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 1998, 2000,
2001; Konings 2001; Ndjio 2006; Nyamnjoh and Rowlands 1998)
highlighted the spatial variability of the politics of belonging across
Cameroon. They also drew attention to the elusive and treacherous
nature of autochthony, which is ‘subject to constant redefinition against
new “others” and at ever-closer range’ (Ceuppens and Geschiere
2005: 385). This iterative process of redefining who is an autochthon
under the banner of ‘the politics of belonging’ outside Africa see Castles and Davidson 2000;
Croucher 2004; Crowley 1999; Dieckhoff 2004; Fortier 2000; Gilroy 2005; Ignatieff 1996;
Savage et al. 2005; Westwood and Phizacklea 2000; Yuval Davis 2003, 2004, 2006. While
the earliest published reference we can find for the phrase is Margaret Roff’s The Politics of
Belonging: political change in Sabah and Sarawak (1974), its extraordinary recent proliferation
in the social sciences seems to date from around 1998. Writing on Africa seems to have played
a very prominent role in the development of this framework.
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binds people into ‘ever-diminishing circles’ of deciding who really
belongs in any particular place (Nyamnjoh 2007). The illusory divisions
represented in such dynamics –what Englund (2004: 11) calls ‘the
spectre of discrete identities’ – presume and encourage the construction
of ‘independent’ ethno-territorial entities, each pursuing its own
agenda within the nation. Such a drift into parochialism is potentially
dangerous because of the ‘epistemological and ideological vacuity
of the discourse of “belonging”’ (Hickey 2004: 11), an emptiness
that the unscrupulous can fill with ethnic chauvinism or other
sectarian notions. All too often a politics of belonging is divisive and
dystopian.
The central concern of the three articles presented as a group here
is that such strong claims about home, belonging and politics are
often difficult to reconcile with the much hazier reality observed on
the ground in Cameroon. This blurring of belonging often stems from
the fact that the relationship between people and place is not always
paramount in the way individuals imagine themselves. The ‘identity’ of
any individual often draws on other territories and on gender, kinship,
religion, profession and education, as well as a rural ‘ethnic homeland’
(Mohan 2006). Actually-existing ‘homes’ are often experienced as
multiple and mobile and are based on a complex calculus of family,
ethnicity, language, lifecourse and work. In the literature on belonging,
home is often physically located as the prospective burial place (Gugler
2002), but this definition risks becoming self-validating as the wish to
be buried at ‘home’ appears to have grown stronger as the language
of the politics of belonging has become entrenched – providing the
lens through which to view these ceremonies (Geschiere 2005; Jua
2005; Mazzucato et al. 2006; Page 2007). The notions of ‘primary
patriotism’ (Geschiere and Gugler 1998b) or ‘local patriotism’ (van
den Bersselaar 2005: 54) demonstrate that this analytical framework
has always been aware that individuals sustain multiple patriotisms
alongside their loyalty to a rural home. Against this diverse background
of obligations the political leverage that can be derived from calling on
autochthony starts to look less effective.
Whilst it would be perverse to ignore the horrors that have been
licensed elsewhere by elite discourses of autochthony (for example
in Côte d’Ivoire), the aim in these articles is at least to disturb
any inevitable or overly tidy segue between belonging and political
segmentation in Cameroon. Too often the existing literature moves too
quickly to an analysis that foregrounds the worrisome dimensions of a
politics of belonging, thus leaving little space for other interpretations.
Undoubtedly the increased emphasis placed on ‘home’ is an empirically
discernible process with significant material impacts, but the more
that observers look for evidence of autochthony, the more they will
find – and, as a result, what they find may shade out other equally
meaningful stories about home and belonging.
Paying attention to other ways in which to analyse affiliations to
home (for example, by foregrounding forms of cooperation and the
achievements of local solidarity) does not mean ignoring the reasonable
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anxieties about the social risks associated with a national politics that
validates autochthony. Work over the last decade provides abundant
evidence of social segmentation and other ‘perils of belonging’
(Geschiere 2009). However, the history of many places can be read
in terms of belonging (with its implications of division) or in terms of
conviviality (with its implications of living peaceably with difference
and of amalgamation), or both (Dafinger and Pelican 2006). Stories
of collaboration across social differences are no less vulnerable to
exploitation by cynical politicians than stories of autochthony, but
drawing attention to those interpretations is the first step in articulating
the possibility of ‘a progressive politics of place’ (Massey 1993, 1994).
After this introduction, this article uses a case study of a boundary
dispute in Mezam, North-West Cameroon to continue to develop this
theme of the tension between belonging and conviviality. The two
articles that follow this are based on studies of home associations (more
usually named ‘cultural and development associations’ in Cameroon or
‘hometown associations’ in the literature). Existing analyses argue that
these associations are an instrument of power and a crucial tool in the
politics of belonging that links urban elites to their rural homelands.
The rise of elite home associations reflects a national politics of self-
serving political entrepreneurs and regional elites seeking personal
platforms and the approval of the ruling party bureaucracy (Bayart
1993; Mbuagbo and Akoko 2004). In contrast, the articles presented
here join a small literature that has viewed the contemporary work of
home associations in more sympathetic light, either because they assert
meaningful political rights (Hickey 2002, 2007; Lentz 2007b; Pelican
2008) or because they deliver improved goods and services (Kabki
et al. 2004; Mercer et al. 2008; Yenshu 2008). Evans’s article explores
ideas about how home associations linked to Manyu in the South-
West Province could potentially contribute to a new form of nation
building (emerging from below) in Cameroon. It suggests that they
are not necessarily a barrier to cohesion because they can be sites
for civic engagement and citizenship formation. Feldman-Savelsberg
and Ndonko’s article draws attention to the importance of gender
and status in these debates. By looking at Bamiléké women’s home
association and non-elite home associations it emphasizes the partiality
of the view that results from treating male elites’ associations as
emblematic of the hometown association’s influence in the politics
of belonging. Their article draws attention to the diverse meanings
of ‘home’ for different types of home associations – and in particular
makes it clear that the idea of home as a ‘refuge’ is only one of these
meanings.
THE BALI–BAWOCK CRISIS OF 2006–7
In early December 2006 government surveyors began work physically
demarcating the boundary between Bali Subdivision and Santa
Subdivision in Mezam Division, in Anglophone north-west Cameroon
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FIGURE 1 Mezam Division, North-West Province
(Figure 1). They were working in the area of four villages: Mantum
and Bawock (in Bali Subdivision) and Mbu and Pinyin (in Santa
Subdivision).2 Soon after they started work in Mantum their boundary
markers were destroyed and they were forcibly prevented from
continuing their task by Bali Nyonga3 youths in the village. The
surveyors were obliged to call in the forces of law and order to extricate
2This account of the dispute between Bali and Bawock is not based on first-hand fieldwork
in Cameroon at the time of the ‘crisis’. We have drawn on fieldwork carried out in 2005
(including interviews with both the Fon of Bali and the Fon of Bawock). The account
developed here also relies (1) on information sent to us in early 2007 by a research assistant
in Bali; (2) on information provided to us by the Bali diaspora in the UK throughout 2007;
(3) on discussions with Bali elites and other informed commentators in Buea in December
2007; and (4) on published sources. Most of the published sources were accessed online and
include the statement of the Fon of Bali’s Traditional Council (which was until relatively
recently available on the website of the Bali-Nyonga Development and Cultural Association),
interviews conducted by Cameroonian journalists and published in the Cameroonian press,
and comments and internet discussion groups.
3The subdivision is called Bali, the main town of the subdivision is referred to as Bali
Town, and the dominant identity within the subdivision describe themselves as Bali-Nyonga,
in order to distinguish themselves from other Bali groups (such as Baligham and Balikumbat)
living elsewhere in the North-West Province. All these different Bali groups claim a shared
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themselves from the mêlée and the boundary demarcation exercise was
abandoned.
Despite cohabitation and intermarriage with neighbours for over
a century, Bawock village is now often perceived to be significantly
different from the villages surrounding it, both those in Bali and those
in Santa. Around 1905 a group of people moved from the town of
Banganté (some 60 miles away) in Ndé Division in the southern part
of the Francophone West Province (Figure 1, inset) to the area of
Bawock (Chilver 1964). Increasingly in recent years the village has
emphasized its historic connections with Banganté. For example, it
has sent dance groups to participate in cultural events in the West
Province and campaigned for a bilingual secondary school in Bawock
teaching in both English and French. Most of the population of Bawock
are Anglophone, but they are happy to identify with French speakers
(for example, their public signage puts French first and their Fon
sometimes chooses to speak in French during public meetings). In so
doing they signify affinity to the predominantly Francophone national
administration and also assert their claim to minority status. These
strategies are symptomatic of the national political climate in Cameroon
with their emphasis on ‘true’ ethnic homelands and ideas of who is a
son or daughter of the soil.
But the differences between Bawock and its neighbours are mostly
organized around ideas of ethnicity. Most people in Bawock now
identify themselves as Bamiléké. Most people in Bali Subdivision
identify themselves as Bali Nyonga, whilst the Santa Council describes
its Subdivision as ‘a melting pot of ethnic groups’ comprising Ngemba,
Moghamo, Chamba, Bamiléké and Mbororo elements (Santa Council
2008).4 However (with the exception of the small numbers of Chamba,
Bamiléké and Mbororo) the different groups in Santa all claim to share
a common Widikum origin. There are, then, three key ethnicities that
are becoming crystallized in the telling of this story: Bamiléké, Bali
Nyonga and Widikum.
During interviews in 2005 the Fon of Bawock (the ‘traditional ruler’)
claimed that his people had been given their land when another group
(the BaTi) left Bali in 1911. He also claimed that the villages of Mbu
and Pinyin (in Santa) had always been their immediate neighbours.5
The village of Mantum (the Fon of Bawock argued) had been created
after that time by Bali Nyonga in an attempt to take land from
Bawock, and the sub-chief of Mantum had been installed to support
this claim. In contrast the people living in Mantum claimed that theirs
was a Bali Nyonga village that lay between Bawock and Mbu, so that
Bawock had no direct boundary with Santa Subdivision. From the
Bali perspective, the boundary-drawing exercise was a covert attempt
Chamba genealogy, though since the Bali-Nyonga are the largest of these groups they
sometimes just describe themselves as Bali.
4On ethnicity and citizenship among the Mbororo see Dafinger and Pelican 2006; Hickey
2007.
5Fon of Bawock, Bawock, 2 March and 6 March 2005.
July 13, 2010 Time: 09:08am afr152.tex
REVISITING THE POLITICS OF BELONGING 351
by Bawock to acquire land at the expense of Bali Nyonga. As the
Bali Traditional Council put it, it is as if ‘Lesotho would be asking
that a boundary be demarcated between herself and Namibia on the
one hand and between herself and Botswana on the other hand and
pretending that there is no South African Territory between’ (Bali
Nyonga Development and Cultural Association 2008). It also claimed
that an important Bali Nyonga shrine is located at the Ntsi-Su’fu
stream, which runs through the disputed land. The flags used in the
annual Lela dance (the most important ceremony in the Bali Nyonga
calendar) are ritually washed at this shrine (Fardon 2006). According
to the Fon of Bali, access to this site had been an issue for some
years:
Every year we have tension with Bawock over the Lela shrine. I am
embarrassed that one group who came to settle in Bali are trying to insulate
themselves. The traditional ruler of Bawock pleaded that he be called Fon,
so we call him Fon. Why do the Bawock people see themselves as separate?
We don’t want them to be Bali. We simply want them to allow us to use our
shrine. (Fon of Bali, 15 March 2005)6
The Bali Traditional Council claims that the land had been given
to Bawock not by the BaTi but by the Bali Nyonga people in the
early twentieth century. Since the Fon of Bawock was recognized as
a second-class chief within the first-class chiefdom of Bali Nyonga by
a government order,7 they claim authority over the Bawock land and
argue that the Fon of Bali should have been involved in any boundary-
making exercise, which in this case he was not – or at least not until a
very late stage.8 The Bali Nyonga felt that they were being deliberately
excluded from the demarcation exercise through the machinations of
the Fon of Bawock, who was being led astray either by Widikum
interests in Santa Subdivision or by those in West Province, or by
persons in the Bawock diaspora overseas. The uncharacteristic alacrity
with which government officials had responded to the appeal for a
boundary-marking exercise from the Fons of Bawock, Pinyin and Mbu
was evidence to those in Bali Nyonga that there was some foul play
or corruption at work. After the skirmish in Mantum all the traditional
rulers appealed for calm, and their instructions were obeyed for a while.
Three months later, in early March 2007, there was further conflict
between Bali Nyonga and Bawock. Again, the basic facts of the story
are contested. According to the Fon of Bawock and his representatives,
on 3 March a Voma group (a Bali Nyonga cult who perform fertility
rites associated with the agricultural year)9 entered Bawock land. It is
6Fon of Bali, speaking at Bali during the Socio-Economic Tour of the Governor of the
North-West Province, 15 March 2005.
7No. 36/A/MINAT/DOT of 19 January 1982.
8Comment (20 March 2007) in response to an article in The Post newspaper,
〈http://www.postnewsline.com/2007/03/bawock_refugees.html〉, accessed 21 July 2008.
9The Voma society is a male cult associated with Chamba kingdoms. Its presence in Bali
Nyonga has ebbed and flowed. Major annual Voma celebrations take place at the end of the
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claimed that the ceremony performed by the Voma continued inside
Bawock land, despite the tension between the two groups that had
followed the events of the previous December. The people in Bawock
viewed this as an attempt to taunt them by asserting Bali ownership
of their land. Various Bawock sources describe this as effectively a
declaration of war by Bali Nyonga on Bawock. On the other hand
(according to the Fon of Bali Nyonga’s Traditional Council) the Voma
always comes out annually at the start of the farming season to bless
the farmlands in order to ensure good yields and on this occasion it
was on its way back to Bali Town from Mantum and was passing
through Bawock along the main road. Bali accounts suggest that the
group accompanying Voma was attacked by youths from Bawock who
seized the sacred Voma bag and burnt it. This was interpreted in Bali
Nyonga as an act of desecration and a declaration of war by the Bawock
on Bali Nyonga.
On 5March there was a fire in the Fon’s palace in Bali Town, starting
at around 4.30 a.m. According to Bali Nyonga accounts this was an
arson attack by a group from Bawock who threw a petrol bomb onto
the grass roof of a holy shrine (the Chum) attached to the palace. Parts
of this building had originally been constructed in 1889 and it was used
to store a number of the Fon’s sacred and secular treasures. The palace
gong brought the people of Bali Town out to fight the fire, but palace
officials maintain that, despite their efforts, the building and its contents
were destroyed.
The next day around 300 buildings in Bawock were razed to the
ground, livestock was butchered and crops destroyed. Government
troops were brought into Bali and Bawock to control the situation and
prevent further violence. According to Bali Nyonga accounts, the Fon
of Bali urged restraint on the morning after the fire and his people
responded to that appeal. They claim that the Bawock people torched
their own homes and then made themselves refugees in order to cast
suspicion onto the people of Bali Nyonga. This was said to be a
replication of the strategy used by the BaTi people against Bali Nyonga
in 1911. According to Bawock accounts (and most press reports) a
group of youths from Bali Nyonga seeking revenge for the fire at
their palace attacked the village of Bawock. They destroyed property,
looted stored food and commodities, and forced the Bawock people
to leave their homes and flee. By the end of the day between 500 and
5,000 people from Bawock had fled the village and large numbers of
them stayed away for several weeks.10 Ultimately around 2,200 people
dry season though the society performs rituals and ceremonies throughout the year, notably in
October and in January–February when it celebrates the festival of ‘first fruits’ and the closing
of the Voma year, known as vomnunga’a. For more on the political organization of Bali see
Chilver and Kaberry 1961 and TintaNji et al. 1988.
10Estimates of how many people fled vary considerably. Accounts are also unclear
about who fled where, and at what point they started to return to Bawock. See
< http://www.postnewsline.com/2007/03/bawock_refugees.html>, accessed 29 March 2010.
Recent council statistics from Bali suggest that Bawock had a population of 5,341 inhabitants
prior to these events.
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formed a ‘refugee camp’ in the Bamenda Congress Hall, the main
public building in the centre of the provincial urban headquarters,
where they received official and charitable aid.11
After some time the people of Bawock began to return to their village
and the process of rebuilding began. This has been assisted by those
who see the Bawock people as a victimized minority in the Subdivision
who were overpowered by Bali Nyonga aggression. However, attempts
have also been made by the people of Bali Nyonga to offer support to
Bawock as a gesture of reconciliation under the guidance of their Fon.
Bali Nyonga found little support from neighbours in the 2007
crisis. Current relations between Bali Nyonga and its neighbours are
profoundly affected by the events of the early colonial era (Chilver
1967). In the two decades around the year 1900 Bali Nyonga was
a sub-imperial power within the Grassfields12 because of an alliance
with German colonialists. In 1891 the Germans trained a ‘Balitruppe’
and armed them with breechloading rifles, enabling them to achieve
dominance over neighbouring polities. In 1905 the Fon of Bali
was recognized by the Germans as regional paramount chief. The
consequence of the alliance was a long history of animosity between
the Bali Nyonga and their neighbours. Not only are the Bali Nyonga
accused of using their power to acquire more land, but they are also
accused of being directly involved in the supply of forced labour from
their neighbours for work on the German plantations on the coast
(Chilver and Röschenthaler 2002).
From the perspective of the Bali Nyonga elites the sympathy within
North-West Province for Bawock and the animosity towards Bali
Nyonga appear to have come as a shock. Speaking at a subsequent
annual general meeting of the Bali Nyonga Development and Cultural
Association, the outgoing President-General commented:
The recent Bawock crisis revealed the actual depth of feeling against
us throughout Mezam. For although we had clearly acted in legitimate
retribution, we were still vehemently condemned, with a fanatical bias that
was totally inconsistent with the love of truth and fairness that was once the
hallmark of this Province. And much as the violence of the propaganda came
as something of a surprise, it also confirmed what we have always suspected:
that when the chips are down, we in Bali have no one but ourselves to count
on. And for that reason, we have a duty to stick together and be doubly
vigilant.
The tone of wounded surprise is somewhat disingenuous given the
widespread consciousness of Bali history and their self-ascribed martial
identity, but the sentiment is absolutely of the current moment in
Cameroonian political rhetoric.
11UNHCR, Cameroon Tribune, 12 March 2007.
12This term is used to describe the area covering large parts of the West and North-West
Provinces and a small part of the South-West Province. It is largely (though not perfectly)
coincident with an area of open highlands and of around 150 hierarchical polities (mostly
referred to as chiefdoms).
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THE ‘POLITICS OF BELONGING’ A DECADE ON
The dispute between Bali and Bawock can clearly be used as evidence
when interpreting events in Cameroon in terms of a ‘politics of
belonging’. It is a conflict about claims over who belongs where, who
has the right to call a particular place their homeland, and who gets
to write the most widely accepted story of particular events. It welds
together questions about land ownership, home, ethnicity and history.
Rival claims over scarce resources (land) are being justified using
ideas of ethnic rights over particular territories. Competition over the
boundaries of parliamentary constituencies are also in the background
in this dispute, with the Santa-Bali constituency ultimately being split
to give Santa its own seat, while Bali has been appended to a Bamenda
seat. The experience for those caught up in these politics is of increased
insularity and inward-looking social relations – the outcome of these
events is the conclusion that ‘we’ can only trust ‘ourselves’. When
John Crawly described the politics of belonging as the ‘ “dirty work”
of boundary maintenance’ (Crawly 1999: 30) he probably did not
envisage the boundary in this literal sense, but his definition perfectly
captures the events described. In this instance the reification of social
boundaries in contemporary Cameroon is materialized through a battle
over real territorial boundaries. But in what ways does this case study
suggest that the character of the politics of belonging has changed over
the last ten years?
First, as time passes the metaphor of ‘ever-diminishing circles’ to
describe these politics increasingly seems less apt than the idea of ‘the
ground being taken from under your feet’. An imagined geography of
Cameroon in which there is a drift towards smaller and smaller units,
each containing ‘true’ autochthons, has become harder to sustain as the
years have passed. This is particularly the case in parts of the country
(such as the North-West and West) where there has been considerable
mobility over the last two centuries. Foregrounding belonging has not
produced a reordering of the population into a static one-dimensional
‘map’ of homelands; rather, it has generated a sense of the strata
of belonging. The search for the true owner of land will often be
fruitless because, as Carola Lentz says, ‘land rights have always been
ambiguous, negotiable and politically embedded, in the pre-colonial
past just as under the colonial regime and in present times’ (Lentz 2006:
34). The idea of the search for the authentic owner of the land rests on
a false idea of the past as both static and separate from the present. Her
argument is only amplified by recognizing the anachronism of speaking
of these ethnic identities in the pre-colonial past as if these labels carried
the same meaning as those operating today.
The Bali Nyonga claim that they gave the people of Bawock their
homeland and that therefore Bawock is both geographically within and
politically under Bali Nyonga rule. Yet Bali historians make no secret
of the fact that they themselves are not the original inhabitants of the
territory they call their homeland. Before this place was Bali it was
Meta and the Bali Nyonga make their claim to ownership of the land
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through an act of appropriation in the mid-nineteenth century.13 The
Bali Nyonga are themselves widely perceived to be relative latecomers
to the Grassfields. A reply to a newspaper article perfectly captures this
widely held sentiment:
the Balis were the last ethnic group to move into the graffiland (Northwest
and Western province) and are a group of the Chamba people ([from
the] Extreme North province and part of Nigeria). The Bamilekes (from
Adamawa), Bamouns and Banso (from Adamawa), Tikars and Balis moved
into this region in that respective order and the Balis were hosted by the
Bamouns [and] Bamilekes before they moved up to the NW.14
The accuracy of this account can be contested, but its importance is
that it is pervasive. It even implicitly introduces the idea that the Bali
Nyonga are not really Cameroonian because their ‘Chamba cradle’ is in
present-day Nigeria. If (as some Bali Nyonga elites suggested in the heat
of the crisis) the Bawock people belonged ‘back’ in the West Province,
then others (Bali Nyonga’s critics) could equally argue that the people
of Bali Nyonga belonged ‘back’ in Nigeria with the other Chambas.
Furthermore, other influential groups in the region (such as those from
Bamoun or Banso, or who claim a Tikar genealogy) know that their
claims to be autochthons stand in contradiction to their claims to have
originally come from elsewhere. As time has passed there is a greater
consciousness of the risks of claiming the status of autochthons.
A second difference relates to the increasing importance of
Cameroonian diaspora groups to local politics at home (Mercer
et al. 2008). Discussions about the Bali–Bawock dispute between Bali
Nyonga individuals in Cameroon, the USA, Western Europe and Asia
almost universally showed unquestioning support for the Bali side. The
only Bali Nyonga criticism of Bali Nyonga actions at home tended
to be cast in a rather moralistic Christian register. In addition some
members of the diaspora have very specific anxieties related to land
inheritance and this provides an incentive for direct involvement in
disputes. However, interviews among the Bali Nyonga diaspora in the
UK also show a weary frustration with Cameroonian politics. Whilst
interviewees clearly expressed their sympathy for those in Bali Nyonga
during the dispute, they were also more cynical about the way in which
events there were being manipulated by some Bali Nyonga elites out
of personal interest and for party political purposes. They expressed
anxieties about the structural conditions of Cameroonian politics that
made the resolution of land disputes very difficult and acted as a barrier
to reconciliation.
13There is another peril here too, though it has never been articulated to us in these terms
in Cameroon. If a past act of appropriation can ensure subsequent ‘belonging’, then logically
another act of appropriation in the present or future will also presumably be an acceptable
means of asserting ownership.
14Comment (20 March 2007) in response to an article in The Post newspaper,
< http://www.postnewsline.com/2007/03/bawock_refugees.html>, accessed 21 July 2008.
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A third difference relates to multi-party democracy in Cameroon.
Whereas opposition parties represented a significant challenge to the
establishment in Cameroon in the 1990s, they no longer do so. The
elections of the 1990s had real meaning in Cameroon. Twelve years
on, the challenge presented by the political opposition has largely
evaporated and the same elite who controlled the ruling party, the
administration and the main routes of economic accumulation in 1990
are still in power now. In the most recent parliamentary elections
(2007) opposition parties were reduced to 15 per cent of the seats,
and some of those parties are overtly allied to the ruling party anyway
(Table 1). Furthermore, if opposition parties do still retain a foothold
in the legislature their power bases are highly localized and only the
Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM)15 can plausibly
claim a national mandate, having even recently taken seats such as
Jakiri in the Social Democratic Front’s (SDF)16 heartland (Table 2).
So confident is the CPDM that it has now retrieved its political
monopoly in Cameroon that it is demanding that the 1996 constitution
be changed in order to allow President Paul Biya to run for election
again in 2011, when his second seven-year term ends.17 Such a
change would be a potent symbol of the evanescence of multi-party
politics in Cameroon, given that a limit of two presidential terms
was one of the opposition’s main tangible outcomes after protests
in the 1990s. A bill to amend the constitution was tabled in April
2008. Street violence in urban centres across Cameroon in February
2008 may partly reflect frustration with the arrogance of the political
establishment.
The argument made a decade ago was that the politics of belonging
in Cameroon and elsewhere was a response to the rise of multi-party
democracy:
In many parts of the continent democratisation seems to encourage the
emergence of a particular form of politics, centred on regional elite
associations, as some sort of alternative to multi-partyism. (Geschiere and
Gugler 1998a: 309)
The idea that ‘settlers’ or ‘strangers’ might influence parliamentary
representation prompted an obsession with questions of origins. Since
the government of Cameroon associated settlers with opposition
political parties it was happy to support home associations (unions
15The CPDM is the ruling party in Cameroon. (French: Rassemblement Démocratique du
Peuple Camerounais, RDPC).
16The Social Democratic Front, founded in 1991, is the largest opposition party in
Parliament. Though it has not been co-opted by the CPDM, it has struggled with internal
factionalism.
17Paul Biya became Prime Minister of Cameroon in 1975 and has been President since
1982. He was re-elected during one-party rule in 1984 and 1988. He was then elected in
disputed multi-party elections in 1992. After the introduction of the 1996 constitution a limit
was placed on the number of Presidential terms that could be served. Paul Biya was re-elected
under this system in 1997 and 2004.
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TABLE 1 Legislative election results, 1992–2007
CPDM SDF Other opposition
1992 88 - 92
1997 109 43 28
2002 149 22 9
2007 153 16 11
Source: African Elections Database, 〈http://africanelections.tripod.com/index.html〉
TABLE 2 Legislative election results by province, 2007
CPDM SDF UNDP CDU PM
Adamawa 9 0 1 0 0
Centre 28 0 0 0 0
East 11 0 0 0 0
Far North 28 0 1 0 0
Littoral 17 1 0 0 1
North 8 0 4 0 0
North West 7 13 0 0 0
West 19 2 0 4 0
South 11 0 0 0 0
South West 15 0 0 0 0
TOTAL 153 16 6 4 1
Source: Cameroon Tribune
Political parties: Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM), Social
Democratic Front (SDF), National Union for Democracy and Progress (NUDP),
Cameroon Democratic Union (CDU), Progressive Movement (PM)
of urbanites who claimed affinity through sharing a common rural
home) precisely because they helped to marginalize ‘strangers’. These
associations were seen as a vehicle that could be used to by-
pass multi-party politics among rural electorates. Since most of
the leaders of the associations were civil servants it was easy for
the ruling party to bring pressure to bear on them to go ‘home’
on campaigns to mobilize votes. Francis Nyamnjoh and Michael
Rowlands went so far as to claim that some of these ‘ethnicized elite
associations’ were ‘the prime movers in local regional politics’ and
signalled ‘the attempt by the ruling party to maintain local support
at all costs’ (1998: 320–1). New and established politicians asserted
their interests in their place of origin through participating in the
association. By pursuing local interests these associations undermined
any attempt to develop a united national opposition during an extended
period of economic and political tensions in the first half of the
1990s.
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A decade or so on, the ‘threat’ to the political establishment from
opposition parties has gone and as a result the political salience of elite
hometown associations is reduced. The work of home associations in
many places is consciously disconnected from politics. The vast bulk of
the time in home association meetings is directed towards discussing
the welfare of members or self-help development projects. In some
cases association members and leaders are almost aggressively wary
of those individuals who seek to use associations as personal political
platforms. Even allowing for the fact that the language of development
is well known for its capacity to depoliticize the politically contentious,
there is little doubt that because the ‘threat’ from multi-party politics
has gone the political urgency to use these associations has also
waned.
If the rise of the politics of belonging was a consequence of the
rise of multi-party democracy, why has the former survived the latter?
It is much harder to erase the idea that autochthons have particular
rights than to validate them through speeches, laws and bureaucratic
regulation. The politics of belonging is not quite a ‘Pandora’s box’
because there are many examples (including Cameroon during the
1970s and 1980s, see Kofele-Kale 1981) where a concerted effort
can dull differences, but nevertheless ‘political tribalism’ (Lonsdale
1992, 1994) has become the standard lens through which many
Cameroonians outside the main cities understand politics (Nyamnjoh
1999). Having endorsed this view it is hard for the establishment to
change it, even if they now wanted to do so. The emphasis on belonging
still serves established interests as it capitalizes on a powerful sense
of local loyalty, whilst containing opposition within those areas that
steadfastly refuse to be co-opted by the ruling party. The apparent
‘naturalness’ of autochthony also makes it ideologically resistant to
change. This has become the way in which Cameroonian citizens ‘do’
politics and imagining other ways of national political being is hard.
Cameroonian politics treats the idea of ‘belonging’ as axiomatic and
incontrovertible (Nyamnjoh 2002; Fonchingong 2005; Jua 2005; Ndjio
2006; W. Nkwi 2006).
However as the significance of multi-party democracy as an
explanation for the rise of autochthony declines, so other explanations
become more apparent. At a global scale there has been a resurgence
of place-based politics. According to Nira Yuval Davis, belonging
is ‘about emotional attachment, about feeling . . . “safe” ’ (2006: 197;
see also Yuval Davis 2003, 2004). Belonging provides a feeling of
security in an apparently unpredicatable world through inter-subjective
acknowledgement. In Cameroon this desire for security is driven by
a sense of powerlessness over the fluctuations of prices for basic
foods, the hikes in energy prices, the retreat of the state from service
provision, the end of familiar forms of employment on plantations or
in the civil service, the lottery for American visas, the capricious rules
governing international migration, the erratic sending of remittances. It
might well be a delusion, but a ‘home’ where familiar people rehearse
familiar rituals and where the lineaments of power are recognizable and
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visible appears to offer some refuge in a changing world. A political
strategy that naturalizes and endorses autochthons’ rights over the
space called home promises (however fictitiously) increased control
over that space. That the real result of such a strategy can include the
maintenance of the political status quo and the efflorescence of conflicts
like the violence in Bawock is of less relevance than the fantasy it
offers.
THE ‘POLITICS OF CONVIVIALITY’
An analysis of Cameroonian politics that identifies the risks of
emphasizing autochthony is convincing, but it is rather negative
because it treats ‘belonging’ and ethnicity as malevolent forces in
politics. Such a position is in line with three decades of social science
in Africa, which has assumed that strong ethnic identities are a barrier
to effective political accountability. The manipulation of place-based
loyalties is indeed ‘worrying’ (Nyamnjoh and Rowlands 1998: 330),
but it is also possible to identify an alternative facet to the politics
of belonging. Belonging not only articulates with ‘political tribalism’
but can also be associated with ‘moral ethnicity’ (Lonsdale 1992,
1994):
Political tribalism flows down from high political intrigue; it constitutes
communities through external competition. Moral ethnicity creates
communities from within through domestic controversy over civic virtue.
It ascends from the deep antagonism to the very forces on which political
tribalism thrives. (Lonsdale 1992: 466)
John Lonsdale uses this distinction to argue that ‘an ethnic imagination
may not be so subversive of modern African states as is generally
believed; it may be constructive’ (Lonsdale 1992: 317–18). Gikuyu
political values can be used by a public to hold its leaders to account.
Or as Chabal and Daloz ask, ‘is it conceivable that . . . a political
compact based on ethnicity could bring together, rather than separate,
the constituent members of what now form African countries?’
(1999: 58).
Political belonging describes a process of exploiting the desire for
a secure home for elite political ends. In contrast moral conviviality
describes local ideas about the right and wrong ways for diverse groups
of people to live together and the process by which local elites can be
disciplined for transgressing such norms. Public deliberations about the
right way to be a good member of a community, which draw on deep
values, are the hallmark of a more co-operative but still local scale
of solidarity. Moral conviviality is closely aligned with a progressive
politics of place (Massey 1993, 1994, 2006), which acknowledges the
internal heterogeneity of communities within any location, tolerates
internal differences, is open to change and newcomers, and has
an outward-looking attitude concerned with developing connections
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across space. Conviviality is no less about being ‘one of the group’ than
belonging, but it is an extroverted rather than an inward-looking group.
There are two dimensions to the way in which moral conviviality
works in Bali. First there is the history of the agglomeration of different
ethnic groups who come together under the umbrella of a single
Bali Nyonga identity. Internal ethnic differences are neither erased
nor forgotten as time passes, but they are contingently set aside.
An exchange of languages, ceremonies and institutions binds these
different groups together by remembering their differences. There is
some evidence that Bali historians are well aware of these internal
differences, but in the current climate there is little incentive to draw
attention to them. Second, there is the need to collaborate and connect
with neighbours (external differences) in order to achieve development
goals that operate at a scale other than the most local.
Both these aspects appear to be instrumental. Framed this way, it
is reasonable to ask whether this should not really be called pragmatic
rather than moral conviviality. However, many Bali interviewees started
debates about social relations from the proposition that a peaceful
environment in its widest sense is better for a contented family and
community life. This betterness is inherent rather than instrumental.
Bali political values claim that it is right in itself for different groups
to cooperate within the community. There is no doubt amongst the
leaders in Bali that the political ideal is of peaceful internal coexistence.
For long periods of time in the twentieth century this goal was achieved.
Of course Bali has no monopoly on asserting such values, but the
point is that they stand in stark contrast both to Bali’s regional
reputation and to the common idiom of current political language,
which emphasizes defence and competition over cooperation. That
recent political practice in Bali has not always reflected such values
is a reflection of the dominance of political belonging over moral
conviviality at the current time. At certain times and in certain places
belonging seems to be dominant. But even in the wake of all the
violence and displacement, moral conviviality was quickly expressed
through attempts at reconciliation. The issue is less one of ‘dominance’
and more one of a never-ending tussle between the two ideas.
The first dimension of conviviality concerns internal heterogeneity.
A politics organized around places inevitably draws attention to the
way in which the groups that live within those places are rarely actually
ethnically homogeneous. Bali Nyonga comprises several groups with
different histories who have coalesced over a period of at least two
centuries (Titanji et al. 1988). One powerful group (closely associated
with the palace) claim a Chamba ancestor and describe a journey
as armed raiders from Adamawa in the late eighteenth century. But
on that journey the Mubakoh-speaking Chamba were joined by Bata,
Pare, Mbum, Buti, Tikari and BaTi elements. This alliance was
defeated militarily by a Bamiléké force in 1835 and then split into
a number of separate rival groups. One of these splinter groups (led
by Nyongpasi – thus Bali Nyonga) joined up with a large group of
BaTi, from whom they acquired the language (Mungaka) that most
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Bali people now speak. For a few decades Mubakoh and Mungaka co-
existed, but by the late nineteenth century Mubakoh had become only
a court language. By 1860 this amalgam had acquired their current
homeland by force from their ‘cousins’ the Bali Nkohntan (who had in
turn taken it by force from its Meta inhabitants) and who were then
incorporated into the new polity. Some of those Meta groups who were
resident on the site also subsequently became incorporated into the Bali
Nyonga polity. Further BaTi groups adhered to Bali just after 1900
and brought the Bawock with them around 1905. Whilst some of the
details of the different groups who amalgamated to form Bali Nyonga
may be lost, different lineages still preserve these numerous internal
differences through male lines of succession, differential roles within
the palace hierarchy, different names and different sub-chieftaincies
(Fardon 2006: 4–5). The Bawock, for example, were respected by the
Bali Nyonga for their wood-carving skills and were actively engaged in
such activities, not least contributing to the construction of pillars in
the palace (Geary 1988: 19–20 and 34).
These internal divisions are well-known within Bali. As one person
put it, ‘you know, Bali is like America. No one can claim indigeneity’;18
or, as another (who consciously combined loyalty to Bali with a loyalty
to one of its sub-villages, Mbufung) said:
Mbufung was originally settled by the Widikum. Bali did not attack, and
they lived together. But now there have been many intermarriages with
Bali people, and the other Widikums fled. So Bali tradition encroached into
Mbufung. Mbufung speaks Mungaka. Only the very old speak the language
of the Widikums. The Tikali, Buti, Ti peoples – they are all strangers. The
real original Bali people are very few. Bali is now very cosmopolitan.19
Not only that, but people from Bali in the international diaspora
are conscious that questions of belonging are being manipulated for
personal political ends amongst the elites in Bali, Santa and Bawock.
This does not mean they do not care about the issue or the loss of
property, but it does show that they are conscious of the way in which
individual ambition is creating tensions in a context where cooperation
is actually part of the history and the everyday reality. The right way
for people to live together in Bali involves acknowledging the value of
different groups, absorbing but not erasing such differences. Such a
strategy has been very successful over a long period of time.
Bali culture and political organization draws from its Grassfields
neighbours as well as its Chamba roots. The Bali Nyonga established
themselves in the nineteenth century by becoming embroiled in a web
of alliances with other Grassfields polities, particularly Bafreng and
Nkwen (Yenshu and Ngwa 2001; Yenshu 2003). The Bali template for
social and political organization was not Chamba, but the successful
neighbouring Grassfields kingdom of Bamun. The model for Bali
18Member of Bali elite, Bamenda, 29 March 2005.
19Member of Bali elite, Bamenda, 29 March 2005.
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Nyonga carving and material culture in general is not the spare style
of the Chamba, but what Richard Fardon calls ‘the Baroque aesthetics
of the Grassfields’ (Fardon 2006: viii). Like Bamun (Geary 1988),
Bali Nyonga embraced the novelty of German material culture and
continued to adopt and adapt new influences throughout the twentieth
century. Far from building on a single Chamba past, Bali culture has
appropriated liberally from a multiplicity of sources over two centuries.
Even the most significant links to Chamba culture (the annual Lela
festival and the Voma secret society) are different from the current
Chamba variants (Fardon 2006). This process was not uni-directional
and aspects of Bali ceremony and political organization were also
adopted by other Grassfields states. However, because of the current
‘need’ to define Bali Nyonga in distinction from its neighbours this
collaborative process of exchange and engagement is an anathema to
some of Bali’s historians.
When the Bali Nyonga elite emphasize their Chamba roots and
their martial past to present contemporary Bali Nyonga as a pure,
homogeneous ethnic identity with an unchanging character, they are
producing a narrative of political belonging. They set out to assert
their difference from their Grassfields neighbours and their capacity
and need to continue to ‘fight’ for their own land. Of course the Bali
Nyonga are not alone in the Grassfields (or indeed anywhere else)
in their selective interpretation of history (Yenshu 2003), but more
importantly many Bali people are well aware of an alternative history
of a process of successfully amalgamating difference.
The second dimension used to exemplify moral conviviality
concerns the need to collaborate with neighbours in order to achieve
development goals. Bali Subdivision, though densely populated, is
small. So although it has some influential elites in key positions in
national government, there are limits to its capacity to capture state
funding to deliver development goods. However, by cooperating with
their neighbours they can secure mutual benefits. In Bali Nyonga’s case
the new tarred main road is a key example, a project in which the elites
worked alongside their historic ‘competitors’ in Batibo (to the west).
Bali and Batibo are both on the Lagos to Mombasa line of the Trans-
Africa Highway Network. However, for many years the earth road has
been in a very poor state, and the short distance to Bamenda could
take travellers most of the day. In 2002–3 Chinese contractors were
given the job of producing a new line for the road and tarring it, which
they did. Taxis now ply the route and the journey takes about half
an hour. This CFA19,500 million project (about £19.5 million) was
primarily funded by the African Development Bank (Fonjong 2004)
but the Cameroon government was closely involved.20 Local elites from
Bali and Batibo believed it was necessary to ‘lobby’ government officials
in Yaoundé to ensure that the road project was not diverted to the
20Prime Minister’s speech in the North-West Province, 5 April 2001.
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north to pass throughMbengwi.21 They collected money to pay officials
in Yaoundé in order to guarantee that the relevant papers moved
through the system, that the contractor was paid promptly, and the
work completed. One member of the Bali elite described this process
to us by comparing their strategy with an earlier episode further west
along the road in Manyu Division of South-West Province:
A similar road plan from Momo to Mamfe collapsed because the Manyu
people were not as organized as those from the North-West. The contractor
was not being paid, the papers were not being given out, they left the project.
With the Bali road they had the same problem but they learnt from this
previous experience. I gave CFA100,000, I got CFA50,000 out of Mr X
although he is staunch SDF and he thought it was going to CPDM–we
paid and got a person to go in, get the papers out, they paid the contractors
and they finished the road. This was the elites – not only from Bali, some
from Batibo.22
Here we see political belonging and moral conviviality at work
simultaneously. Bali and Batibo (with their history of conflict)
cooperate across the boundaries of belonging, though they do so at the
expense of Mbengwi and (rhetorically) of Manyu.
This example shows that the differences on which the politics of
belonging are founded can be set aside relatively easily for the practical
necessities of economic interest. The same point emerges through
interviews with Meta people in Bossa village, who prefer to live in Bali
Subdivision rather than in the largely Meta Subdivision of Momo:
If you asked everyone in Bossa, 80–90 per cent of them would tell you that
they prefer to be in Bali rather than Momo Subdivision. Why? Because Bali
is a small subdivision. When [government resources] come to Bali, Bossa
always gets a share. But if we were under Mbengwi, where there are no
roads, no schools, and twenty-something villages, we in Bossa will not get
our share of the cake.23
Conviviality is not unambiguously benevolent. It often rests on the
exigencies of self-interest, but it does at least open up possibilities of a
politics that exploits local loyalties to home without necessarily leading
to conflict.
CONCLUSION
The initial motivation for emphasizing the rights of autochthons was
to undermine multi-party democracy. This specific context has been
replaced by habit and by the local impact of the general context of
global integration. The politics of home and belonging go with the grain
of current popular sentiment because it speaks to the anxieties of rapid
21Member of Bali elite, Bali, 15 February 2005.
22Member of Bali elite, Limbe, 20 April 2005.
23Member of Bossa elite, Bali, 5 March 2005.
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social change. A desire for belonging is not only a force that can lead
to increased local conflicts; it can also simultaneously be a platform
for conviviality. Local ideas about the merits of internal cooperation
across ethnic difference and external neighbourliness all rest on the
idea that conviviality is both inherently good and also useful. As one
elite interviewee put it: ‘We do not want to put fire under any other
pot. We want Bali as a peaceful unit. Let whatever people do be for
the interest of Bali.’24 Unobtrusively there is a great deal of successful
living together despite differences at a variety of scales (from individual
marriages to shared village development projects). There is a long
history of absorption of other peoples and their cultures into Bali; the
resulting mix makes Bali what it is. Becoming conscious of belonging
can foster recognition of internal differences, which might also help to
cultivate better external relations.
Yet such ideas do not exist in a vacuum. They have to compete
with the alternative ideas that are associated with political belonging.25
Evidence of people thinking of Bali as a homogeneous, unchanging
place with clearly defined boundaries is easy to find. Such an imaginary
produces a narrow account of history and an introverted sense of
place with an internalized search for origins. This is the source of the
bellicose stereotype of ‘Bali man’. It would be perverse to pretend that
this set of ideas is not common at the current time. For example the
formal, high-profile elements of Bali ceremony (such as Lela), which
are demonstrations of the Fon’s wealth and military strength, lend
themselves easily to an interpretation that emphasizes conflict rather
than cooperation. The overt violence between Bali and Bawock is the
consequence of allowing political belonging to dominate.
In 2005 the Governor of the North-West Province rebuked the
population of Bali Subdivision:
You are fighting yourselves –Bali Nyonga, Bawock, Mbororo –where are
you going to? You should consider yourselves as people of the same
subdivision. This is a problem of tribalism . . . you know your problem is
not chieftaincy, it is tribalism [laughter in audience]. . . . You must accept
each other.26
There is considerable chutzpah in the representative of the Cameroon
government castigating citizens for tribalism, given the government’s
role in reviving political belonging. Such a move tries to relocate the
origin of the struggle between political belonging and moral conviviality
to the local level. It is a distancing gesture that enables the state to
slough off responsibility for the circumstances it helped to create.
24Member of Bali elite, Bali, 15 March 2005.
25For similar debates in the Kenyan context, see Orvis 2001 and Klopp 2002.
26His Excellency Koumpa Issa, Governor of the North-West Province, Bali, 15 March
2005.
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ABSTRACT
The article introduces a themed section in the journal on hometown
associations in Cameroon. It outlines the impact of ten years’ work in this
field and argues that notions of autochthony remain central in understanding
Cameroonian politics. However the three articles go on to argue that some
of the claims about home, belonging and politics are difficult to reconcile
with the hazier reality observed on the ground. The articles aim to disturb
any universal, inevitable or overly tidy segue between questions of belonging
and claims of political segmentation. Too often the existing literature moves
too quickly to an analysis that foregrounds only the worrisome dimensions of
a politics of belonging, thus leaving little space for other interpretations. To
explore this dilemma the article continues by exploring a land dispute in Bali
Nyonga, north-west Cameroon. It shows (1) how ideas of belonging remain
central to the practice of politics; (2) how the politics of belonging has changed
over time; and (3) how it is possible to foreground an alternative ‘politics of
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conviviality’, which would otherwise be shaded out by the dominance of the
politics of belonging within the literature.
RÉSUMÉ
Cet article présente une rubrique thématique de revue consacrée aux
associations de ressortissants au Cameroun. Il décrit brièvement l’impact
de dix années de travaux dans ce domaine et soutient que les
notions d’autochtonie demeurent centrales pour comprendre la politique
camerounaise. Or, les trois articles affirment qu’il est difficile de concilier
certaines assertions concernant le lieu d’origine, l’appartenance et la politique
avec la réalité plus floue observée sur le terrain. Ces articles cherchent
à troubler toute articulation universelle, inévitable ou trop ordonnée entre
les questions d’appartenance et les assertions de segmentation politique.
La littérature existante s’empresse trop souvent de proposer une analyse
qui ne met en avant que les dimensions préoccupantes d’une politique
d’appartenance, ne laissant ainsi que peu de place à d’autres interprétations.
L’article étudie ensuite ce dilemme à travers un contentieux foncier à Bali
Nyonga, dans le Nord-Ouest du Cameroun. Il montre (1) comment les
idées d’appartenance demeurent centrales dans la pratique de la politique,
(2) comment la politique d’appartenance a évolué au fil du temps et (3)
comment il est possible de mettre en avant une autre politique, une « politique
de convivialité », que risquerait d’éclipser la prépondérance de la politique
d’appartenance dans la littérature.
